--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include "statem_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+ unsigned char *p);
+
+/*
+ * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
+{
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
+ && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1: Yes
+ * 0: No
+ */
+static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
+{
+ long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /*
+ * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+ * ciphersuite or for SRP
+ */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
+ | SSL_kSRP)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
+ * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
+ * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
+ * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
+ *
+ * Return values are:
+ * 1: Success (transition allowed)
+ * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+ int ske_expected;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
+ && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
+ * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
+ * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
+ * the server is resuming.
+ */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
+ & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+ /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+ if (ske_expected
+ || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
+ && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
+ /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
+ if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
+ && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Fall through */
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err:
+ /* No valid transition found */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
+ * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
+ */
+WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ /* Renegotiation - fall through */
+ case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ /*
+ * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
+ * we will be sent
+ */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+ * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+ * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+ * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ }
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#else
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
+ else
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+#endif
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+#endif
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
+ }
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ if (s->hit) {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
+ return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
+ * the client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
+ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
+ * messages unless we need to.
+ */
+ st->use_timer = 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
+ return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
+#endif
+ }
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+ case TLS_ST_OK:
+ return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
+
+ default:
+ /* No pre work to be done */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
+ * client to the server.
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
+ 0, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* No post work to be done */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
+ *
+ * Valid return values are:
+ * 1: Success
+ * 0: Error
+ */
+int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
+ return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
+ return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
+ return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+ else
+ return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
+ return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
+#endif
+ case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
+ return tls_construct_finished(s,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
+ * reading. Excludes the message header.
+ */
+unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ /*
+ * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
+ * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
+ * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
+ */
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ return 3;
+ return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
+ */
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
+ return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
+
+ case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
+ return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
+ return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
+ return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
+ return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
+ return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
+ return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
+
+ case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
+ return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
+
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
+ * from the server
+ */
+WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
+
+ switch (st->hand_state) {
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
+ return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
+ /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
+ if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+ ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i;
+ int protverr;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int al = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
+ protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
+ /*
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+ * "ticket" without a session ID.
+ */
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+ (sess->not_resumable)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+ /*
+ * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+ * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ size_t idx;
+ i = 1;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
+ if (p[idx]) {
+ i = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+ i = 1;
+
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ */
+ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i = 0;
+ else
+ i = s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++) = i;
+ if (i != 0) {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+ p += i;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+ * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+ * use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+ i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+ s2n(i, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 1;
+#else
+
+ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j = 0;
+ else
+ j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++) = 1 + j;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ *(p++) = comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ &al)) == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ l = p - d;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
+ PACKET cookiepkt;
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
+ if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ PACKET session_id;
+ size_t session_id_len;
+ const unsigned char *cipherchars;
+ int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ unsigned int compression;
+ unsigned int sversion;
+ int protverr;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
+ if (protverr != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* load the server hello data */
+ /* load the server random */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /* Get the session-id. */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
+ if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
+ || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+ * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+ * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+ * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+ * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+ * server wants to resume.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+ s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
+ session_id_len) == 0) {
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+ s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
+ /* session_id_len could be 0 */
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
+ session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
+ if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
+ * version.
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
+ s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
+ /*
+ * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
+ * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
+ */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+ * set and use it for comparison.
+ */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (compression != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (compression == 0)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
+ }
+
+ if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
+ * no SCTP used.
+ */
+ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+ sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey),
+ labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
+ unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ certstart = certbytes;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ /*
+ * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
+ * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
+ * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
+ * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
+ * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
+ * reverted because at least one application *only* set
+ * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
+ * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
+ * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
+ * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
+ * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
+ * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
+ */
+ if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+ if (i > 1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->peer_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+ * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
+ */
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ sk = NULL;
+ /*
+ * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
+ */
+
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+
+ if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
+ && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
+ (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
+ && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->peer_type = i;
+
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ X509_up_ref(x);
+ s->session->peer = x;
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ x = NULL;
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ goto done;
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ done:
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ PACKET psk_identity_hint;
+
+ /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
+ * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity.
+ */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
+ &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
+ PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.g =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
+ PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.s =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
+ || (s->srp_ctx.B =
+ BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
+ PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We must check if there is a certificate */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
+
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ dh = DH_new();
+
+ if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
+ g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);
+ bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
+ NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = g = NULL;
+
+ if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ bnpub_key = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
+ * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(bnpub_key);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ PACKET encoded_pt;
+ const unsigned char *ecparams;
+ int curve_nid;
+ unsigned int curve_flags;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+ * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
+ * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
+ * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
+
+ if (curve_nid == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
+ EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
+
+ if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
+ } else {
+ /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
+ PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+ * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+ * and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
+ *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al = -1;
+ long alg_k;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ PACKET save_param_start, signature;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ save_param_start = *pkt;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
+ s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ PACKET params;
+ int maxsig;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
+ * equals the length of the parameters.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
+ PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ int rv;
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ md = EVP_md5_sha1();
+ } else {
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (maxsig < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check signature length
+ */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
+ PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
+ PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ } else {
+ /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
+ /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
+ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ err:
+ if (al != -1)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
+ s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
+ if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
+ /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
+ s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
+ if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
+ s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
+ ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ }
+ if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl_set_default_md(s);
+ }
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ namestart = namebytes;
+
+ if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
+ name_len)) == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ xn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ done:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al;
+ unsigned int ticklen;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+ if (ticklen == 0)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ /*
+ * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+ * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+ * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+ * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+ * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+ * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+ * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+ * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+ */
+ if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ int al;
+ unsigned long resplen;
+ unsigned int type;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
+ || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+ * the server
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
+ * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
+ * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+ SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
+ SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
+ if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Only applies to renegotiation */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
+ && s->renegotiate != 0)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ else
+#endif
+ return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
+ size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ int ret = 0;
+ /*
+ * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+ * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+ * strnlen.
+ */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+ size_t identitylen = 0;
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
+ char *tmpidentity = NULL;
+ size_t psklen = 0;
+
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ identitylen = strlen(identity);
+ if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
+ if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ tmppsk = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
+ tmpidentity = NULL;
+ s2n(identitylen, *p);
+ memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);
+ *pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
+ *p += identitylen;
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
+
+ return ret;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ size_t enclen;
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ q = *p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ *p += 2;
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *len = enclen;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ pctx = NULL;
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+ (*p)[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s2n(*len, q);
+ *len += 2;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
+
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* send off the data */
+ DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
+ *len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
+ s2n(*len, *p);
+ BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
+ *len += 2;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
+
+ skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
+
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate encoding of client key */
+ encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
+
+ if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ ckey = NULL;
+
+ *len = encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /* length of encoded point */
+ **p = *len;
+ *p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);
+ /* increment len to account for length field */
+ *len += 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
+ int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
+ dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
+
+ /*
+ * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+ */
+ peer_cert = s->session->peer;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+ * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+ pmslen = 32;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ };
+ /*
+ * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+ * data
+ */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (ukm_hash == NULL
+ || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ ukm_hash = NULL;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
+ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*
+ * Encapsulate it into sequence
+ */
+ *((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen = 255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+ *((*p)++) = 0x81;
+ *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ *len = msglen + 3;
+ } else {
+ *((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ *len = msglen + 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
+ s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+ /* send off the data */
+ *len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+ s2n(*len, *p);
+ BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
+ *len += 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+#else
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int len;
+ size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ int al = -1;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
+ && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ len = 0;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ len += pskhdrlen;
+
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (al != -1)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
+
+ pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
+ pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Check for SRP */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ pms = NULL;
+ pmslen = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+ * used.
+ */
+ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
+ sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
+ s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
+ unsigned u = 0;
+ unsigned long n = 0;
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+
+ mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (mctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+ n = 2;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+ || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
+ && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
+ s->session->master_key_length,
+ s->session->master_key))
+ || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ {
+ int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
+ || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
+ BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
+ * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
+ * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
+ return 0;
+ /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
+ * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+ !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+ /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+ i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+
+ /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ /*
+ * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(-1); We then get retied later
+ */
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ X509_free(x509);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ i = 0;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Shouldn't ever get here */
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+}
+
+int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+ 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ossl_statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int idx;
+#endif
+ long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ return (1);
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ idx = s->session->peer_type;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
+ /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+ pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
+ i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
+
+ /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d[4] = len;
+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+ i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+ SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+ px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+ return i;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p)
+{
+ int i, j = 0;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ unsigned char *q;
+ int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+ /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+ ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+ if (sk == NULL)
+ return (0);
+ q = p;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+ /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+ if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+ j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+ * applicable SCSVs.
+ */
+ if (p != q) {
+ if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+ static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+ 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+ };
+ j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
+ p += j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return (p - q);
+}
projects / cassiopeia.git / blobdiff