--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#define USE_SOCKETS
+#include "../ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include "record_locl.h"
+
+int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
+
+ if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ rl->d = d;
+
+ d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
+ d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
+ d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
+
+ if (d->unprocessed_rcds.q == NULL || d->processed_rcds.q == NULL
+ || d->buffered_app_data.q == NULL) {
+ pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
+ OPENSSL_free(d);
+ rl->d = NULL;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
+ pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
+ pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
+ OPENSSL_free(rl->d);
+ rl->d = NULL;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ pqueue *unprocessed_rcds;
+ pqueue *processed_rcds;
+ pqueue *buffered_app_data;
+
+ d = rl->d;
+
+ while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+
+ unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
+ processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
+ buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
+ memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
+ d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
+ d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
+ d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
+{
+ if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
+ memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
+ rl->write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
+ rl->d->last_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+ } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
+ memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
+ rl->write_sequence, sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
+ memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
+ rl->d->curr_write_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+ }
+ rl->d->w_epoch = e;
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+{
+ memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+}
+
+void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
+{
+ memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
+}
+
+static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+ int len);
+
+/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
+static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
+{
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+
+ rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+
+ SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
+
+ s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
+ memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
+ memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
+{
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
+ pitem *item;
+
+ /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
+ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
+ item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
+ if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
+ rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
+ memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
+ memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
+
+ item->data = rdata;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+ (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
+ || SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) {
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
+ sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
+ s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
+ memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
+ memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
+ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(rdata);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
+{
+ pitem *item;
+
+ item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
+ if (item) {
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
+ * processed yet
+ */
+#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
+ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+ &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
+
+int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
+{
+ pitem *item;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+ int replayok = 1;
+
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
+ if (item) {
+ /* Check if epoch is current. */
+ if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
+ return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+
+ rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rb) > 0) {
+ /*
+ * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
+ * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
+ * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
+ * finished reading the current packet).
+ */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Process all the records. */
+ while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
+ dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
+ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+ if (bitmap == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
+ * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
+ * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
+#endif
+ {
+ /*
+ * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
+ * check once already when we first received the record - but
+ * we might have updated the window since then due to
+ * records we subsequently processed.
+ */
+ replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
+ }
+
+ if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
+ /* dump this record */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
+ * processed
+ */
+ s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
+ s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
+ * 'type' is one of the following:
+ *
+ * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
+ * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
+ * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
+ *
+ * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
+ * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
+ *
+ * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
+ * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
+ * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
+ * argument is non NULL.
+ * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
+ * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
+ * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
+ * Change cipher spec protocol
+ * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
+ * Alert protocol
+ * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
+ * Handshake protocol
+ * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
+ * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
+ * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
+ * Application data protocol
+ * none of our business
+ */
+int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
+ int len, int peek)
+{
+ int al, i, j, ret;
+ unsigned int n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
+
+ if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
+ /* Not initialized yet */
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
+ (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
+ */
+ if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len))) {
+ *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
+ * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
+ * SCTP.
+ */
+ if ((!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
+ (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))
+ && ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)
+ && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
+#else
+ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s))
+#endif
+ {
+ /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ start:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+
+ /*-
+ * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
+ * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
+ */
+ rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
+
+ /*
+ * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
+ * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
+ */
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+ pitem *item;
+ item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
+ if (item) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
+ sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for timeout */
+ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
+ goto start;
+
+ /* get new packet if necessary */
+ if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
+ || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
+ ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
+ /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ return (ret);
+ else
+ goto start;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
+ * record that isn't an alert.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+ && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
+ s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
+
+ /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
+
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
+ * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
+ && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ /*
+ * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
+ * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
+ * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
+ */
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
+ * 'peek' mode)
+ */
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
+ || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
+ /*
+ * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
+ * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ */
+ /*
+ * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
+ * doing a handshake for the first time
+ */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (recvd_type != NULL)
+ *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return (len);
+
+ if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+ n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
+ else
+ n = (unsigned int)len;
+
+ memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
+ if (!peek) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
+ s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
+ }
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
+ * data first, so retry.
+ */
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
+ ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(s)) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
+ * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
+ * anymore, finally set shutdown.
+ */
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+ s->d1->shutdown_received
+ && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return (0);
+ }
+#endif
+ return (n);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
+ * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
+ * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
+ */
+ {
+ unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *dest = NULL;
+ unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
+
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
+ dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
+ } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
+ dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
+ dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
+ /* We allow a 0 return */
+ if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Exit and notify application to read again */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ return (-1);
+ }
+#endif
+ /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+ else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
+ * reading.
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ BIO *bio;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
+ /*
+ * XDTLS: In a pathological case, the Client Hello may be
+ * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
+ */
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
+#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
+ /*
+ * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
+ * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
+ * non-existing alert...
+ */
+ FIX ME;
+#endif
+ s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /* now move 'n' bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
+ dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
+ }
+ *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+ * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+ */
+
+ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
+ if ((!s->server) &&
+ (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+ (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
+ (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
+ s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
+ (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
+ (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
+ */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
+ !s->s3->renegotiate) {
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ ssl3_renegotiate(s);
+ if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
+ /* no read-ahead left? */
+ BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * In the case where we try to read application data,
+ * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
+ * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
+ * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
+ * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
+ */
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
+ int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
+
+ s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
+ s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ }
+
+ if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
+ s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
+
+ s->rlayer.alert_count++;
+ if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /*
+ * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
+ * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
+ * that nothing gets discarded.
+ */
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
+ BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ return (0);
+ }
+#if 0
+ /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
+ /* now check if it's a missing record */
+ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
+ unsigned short seq;
+ unsigned int frag_off;
+ unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
+
+ n2s(p, seq);
+ n2l3(p, frag_off);
+
+ dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority
+ (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
+ &found);
+ if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ /*
+ * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
+ */
+ /*
+ * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
+ * ourselves
+ */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
+ char tmp[16];
+
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
+ BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+ s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
+ * shutdown */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ /*
+ * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
+ * are still missing, so just drop it.
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
+ */
+ if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
+ !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+ /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
+ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
+ if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
+ * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
+ if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+ !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->new_session = 1;
+ }
+ i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (i);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
+ /* no read-ahead left? */
+ BIO *bio;
+ /*
+ * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
+ * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
+ * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
+ * problems in the blocking world
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ }
+ goto start;
+ }
+
+ switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
+ default:
+ /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
+ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ goto start;
+ }
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
+ case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
+ /*
+ * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
+ * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
+ * that should not happen when type != rr->type
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ /*
+ * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
+ * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
+ * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
+ * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
+ * started), we will indulge it.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
+ (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
+ ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ return (-1);
+ } else {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ /* not reached */
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+ /*
+ * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
+ * is started.
+ */
+static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
+ int len)
+{
+
+ if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
+ /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
+ {
+ unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
+ unsigned char *dst = buf;
+ unsigned int k, n;
+
+ /* peek == 0 */
+ n = 0;
+ while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
+ *dst++ = *src++;
+ len--;
+ s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
+ n++;
+ }
+ /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
+ for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
+ s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
+ return n;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
+ * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
+ */
+int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
+ return i;
+}
+
+int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *pseq;
+ int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
+ int prefix_len = 0;
+ int eivlen;
+ SSL3_RECORD wr;
+ SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+
+ wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
+
+ /*
+ * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
+ * will happen with non blocking IO
+ */
+ if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
+ return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
+ }
+
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
+ i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ return (i);
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ return 0;
+
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if ((sess == NULL) ||
+ (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
+ clear = 1;
+
+ if (clear)
+ mac_size = 0;
+ else {
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ if (mac_size < 0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
+
+ /* write the header */
+
+ *(p++) = type & 0xff;
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type);
+ /*
+ * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
+ * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
+ * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
+ */
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
+ s->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
+ *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
+ } else {
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ }
+
+ /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
+ pseq = p;
+ p += 10;
+
+ /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
+ int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ if (eivlen <= 1)
+ eivlen = 0;
+ }
+ /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
+ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+ eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
+ eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+ else
+ eivlen = 0;
+ } else
+ eivlen = 0;
+
+ /* lets setup the record stuff. */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr, (int)len);
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
+
+ /*
+ * we now 'read' from wr.input, wr.length bytes into wr.data
+ */
+
+ /* first we compress */
+ if (s->compress != NULL) {
+ if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(&wr),
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we should still have the output to wr.data and the input from
+ * wr.input. Length should be wr.length. wr.data still points in the
+ * wb->buf
+ */
+
+ if (mac_size != 0) {
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr,
+ &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr) + eivlen]),
+ 1) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, mac_size);
+ }
+
+ /* this is true regardless of mac size */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr, p);
+ SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr);
+
+ if (eivlen)
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, eivlen);
+
+ if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, &wr, 1, 1) < 1)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* record length after mac and block padding */
+ /*
+ * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
+ * SSL_in_init(s)))
+ */
+
+ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
+
+ s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
+
+ /* XDTLS: ?? */
+ /*
+ * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
+ */
+
+ memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
+ pseq += 6;
+ s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr), pseq);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /*
+ * we should now have wr.data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
+ * wr->length long
+ */
+ SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
+ SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
+
+ if (create_empty_fragment) {
+ /*
+ * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
+ * out anything here
+ */
+ return wr.length;
+ }
+
+ /* now let's set up wb */
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr));
+ SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
+ * retries later
+ */
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
+
+ /* we now just need to write the buffer */
+ return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+ err:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
+ unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
+{
+
+ *is_next_epoch = 0;
+
+ /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
+ if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
+ return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
+
+ /*
+ * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
+ * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
+ * epoch
+ */
+ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
+ s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch &&
+ (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
+ *is_next_epoch = 1;
+ return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
+{
+ unsigned char *seq;
+ unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
+
+ if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
+ seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
+ s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
+ memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
+ sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
+ memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
+
+ /*
+ * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
+ * epoch
+ */
+ dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
+ } else {
+ seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
+ memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
+ sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
+ s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
+ }
+
+ memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);
+}
projects / cassiopeia.git / blobdiff