X-Git-Url: https://code.wpia.club/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=lib%2Fopenssl%2Fcrypto%2Fengine%2Feng_rsax.c;fp=lib%2Fopenssl%2Fcrypto%2Fengine%2Feng_rsax.c;h=96e63477eedb277e1059731bd47804aa8be1bb9b;hb=9ff1530871deeb0f7eaa35ca0db6630724045e4a;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hpb=25b73076b01ae059da1a2e9a1677e00788ada620;p=cassiopeia.git diff --git a/lib/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c b/lib/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96e6347 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c @@ -0,0 +1,668 @@ +/* crypto/engine/eng_rsax.c */ +/* Copyright (c) 2010-2010 Intel Corp. + * Author: Vinodh.Gopal@intel.com + * Jim Guilford + * Erdinc.Ozturk@intel.com + * Maxim.Perminov@intel.com + * Ying.Huang@intel.com + * + * More information about algorithm used can be found at: + * http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/srds2009/escs2009_submission_Gopal.pdf + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * licensing@OpenSSL.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + */ + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +/* RSAX is available **ONLY* on x86_64 CPUs */ +#undef COMPILE_RSAX + +#if (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \ + defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) +#define COMPILE_RSAX +static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax (void); +#endif + +void ENGINE_load_rsax (void) + { +/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */ +#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX + ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_rsax(); + if(!toadd) return; + ENGINE_add(toadd); + ENGINE_free(toadd); + ERR_clear_error(); +#endif + } + +#ifdef COMPILE_RSAX +#define E_RSAX_LIB_NAME "rsax engine" + +static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e); +static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e); +static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* RSA stuff */ +static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); +static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *r); +#endif + +static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN e_rsax_cmd_defns[] = { + {0, NULL, NULL, 0} + }; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD e_rsax_rsa = + { + "Intel RSA-X method", + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL, + e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp, + NULL, + NULL, + e_rsax_rsa_finish, + RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL + }; +#endif + +/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */ +static const char *engine_e_rsax_id = "rsax"; +static const char *engine_e_rsax_name = "RSAX engine support"; + +/* This internal function is used by ENGINE_rsax() */ +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *meth1; +#endif + if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_e_rsax_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_e_rsax_name) || +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &e_rsax_rsa) || +#endif + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, e_rsax_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, e_rsax_init) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, e_rsax_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, e_rsax_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, e_rsax_cmd_defns)) + return 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc; + e_rsax_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec; + e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = meth1->rsa_priv_enc; + e_rsax_rsa.rsa_priv_dec = meth1->rsa_priv_dec; + e_rsax_rsa.bn_mod_exp = meth1->bn_mod_exp; +#endif + return 1; + } + +static ENGINE *ENGINE_rsax(void) + { + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + if(!ret) + return NULL; + if(!bind_helper(ret)) + { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Used to attach our own key-data to an RSA structure */ +static int rsax_ex_data_idx = -1; +#endif + +static int e_rsax_destroy(ENGINE *e) + { + return 1; + } + +/* (de)initialisation functions. */ +static int e_rsax_init(ENGINE *e) + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) + rsax_ex_data_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + NULL, + NULL, NULL, NULL); +#endif + if (rsax_ex_data_idx == -1) + return 0; + return 1; + } + +static int e_rsax_finish(ENGINE *e) + { + return 1; + } + +static int e_rsax_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)) + { + int to_return = 1; + + switch(cmd) + { + /* The command isn't understood by this engine */ + default: + to_return = 0; + break; + } + + return to_return; + } + + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + +#ifdef _WIN32 +typedef unsigned __int64 UINT64; +#else +typedef unsigned long long UINT64; +#endif +typedef unsigned short UINT16; + +/* Table t is interleaved in the following manner: + * The order in memory is t[0][0], t[0][1], ..., t[0][7], t[1][0], ... + * A particular 512-bit value is stored in t[][index] rather than the more + * normal t[index][]; i.e. the qwords of a particular entry in t are not + * adjacent in memory + */ + +/* Init BIGNUM b from the interleaved UINT64 array */ +static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array); + +/* Extract array elements from BIGNUM b + * To set the whole array from b, call with n=8 + */ +static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array); + +struct mod_ctx_512 { + UINT64 t[8][8]; + UINT64 m[8]; + UINT64 m1[8]; /* 2^278 % m */ + UINT64 m2[8]; /* 2^640 % m */ + UINT64 k1[2]; /* (- 1/m) % 2^128 */ +}; + +static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data); + +void mod_exp_512(UINT64 *result, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ + UINT64 *g, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ + UINT64 *exp, /* 512 bits, 8 qwords */ + struct mod_ctx_512 *data); + +typedef struct st_e_rsax_mod_ctx +{ + UINT64 type; + union { + struct mod_ctx_512 b512; + } ctx; + +} E_RSAX_MOD_CTX; + +static E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *e_rsax_get_ctx(RSA *rsa, int idx, BIGNUM* m) +{ + E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr; + + if (idx < 0 || idx > 2) + return NULL; + + hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); + if (!hptr) { + hptr = OPENSSL_malloc(3*sizeof(E_RSAX_MOD_CTX)); + if (!hptr) return NULL; + hptr[2].type = hptr[1].type= hptr[0].type = 0; + RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, hptr); + } + + if (hptr[idx].type == (UINT64)BN_num_bits(m)) + return hptr+idx; + + if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { + UINT64 _m[8]; + bn_extract_to_array_512(m, 8, _m); + memset( &hptr[idx].ctx.b512, 0, sizeof(struct mod_ctx_512)); + mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(_m, &hptr[idx].ctx.b512); + } + + hptr[idx].type = BN_num_bits(m); + return hptr+idx; +} + +static int e_rsax_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) + { + E_RSAX_MOD_CTX *hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx); + if(hptr) + { + OPENSSL_free(hptr); + RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsax_ex_data_idx, NULL); + } + if (rsa->_method_mod_n) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); + if (rsa->_method_mod_p) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); + if (rsa->_method_mod_q) + BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); + return 1; + } + + +static int e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *e, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont, E_RSAX_MOD_CTX* rsax_mod_ctx ) +{ + if (rsax_mod_ctx && BN_get_flags(e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) { + if (BN_num_bits(m) == 512) { + UINT64 _r[8]; + UINT64 _g[8]; + UINT64 _e[8]; + + /* Init the arrays from the BIGNUMs */ + bn_extract_to_array_512(g, 8, _g); + bn_extract_to_array_512(e, 8, _e); + + mod_exp_512(_r, _g, _e, &rsax_mod_ctx->ctx.b512); + /* Return the result in the BIGNUM */ + interleaved_array_to_bn_512(r, _r); + return 1; + } + } + + return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, g, e, m, ctx, in_mont); +} + +/* Declares for the Intel CIAP 512-bit / CRT / 1024 bit RSA modular + * exponentiation routine precalculations and a structure to hold the + * necessary values. These files are meant to live in crypto/rsa/ in + * the target openssl. + */ + +/* + * Local method: extracts a piece from a BIGNUM, to fit it into + * an array. Call with n=8 to extract an entire 512-bit BIGNUM + */ +static int bn_extract_to_array_512(const BIGNUM* b, unsigned int n, UINT64 *array) +{ + int i; + UINT64 tmp; + unsigned char bn_buff[64]; + memset(bn_buff, 0, 64); + if (BN_num_bytes(b) > 64) { + printf ("Can't support this byte size\n"); + return 0; } + if (BN_num_bytes(b)!=0) { + if (!BN_bn2bin(b, bn_buff+(64-BN_num_bytes(b)))) { + printf ("Error's in bn2bin\n"); + /* We have to error, here */ + return 0; } } + while (n-- > 0) { + array[n] = 0; + for (i=7; i>=0; i--) { + tmp = bn_buff[63-(n*8+i)]; + array[n] |= tmp << (8*i); } } + return 1; +} + +/* Init a 512-bit BIGNUM from the UINT64*_ (8 * 64) interleaved array */ +static int interleaved_array_to_bn_512(BIGNUM* b, UINT64 *array) +{ + unsigned char tmp[64]; + int n=8; + int i; + while (n-- > 0) { + for (i = 7; i>=0; i--) { + tmp[63-(n*8+i)] = (unsigned char)(array[n]>>(8*i)); } } + BN_bin2bn(tmp, 64, b); + return 0; +} + + +/* The main 512bit precompute call */ +static int mod_exp_pre_compute_data_512(UINT64 *m, struct mod_ctx_512 *data) + { + BIGNUM two_768, two_640, two_128, two_512, tmp, _m, tmp2; + + /* We need a BN_CTX for the modulo functions */ + BN_CTX* ctx; + /* Some tmps */ + UINT64 _t[8]; + int i, j, ret = 0; + + /* Init _m with m */ + BN_init(&_m); + interleaved_array_to_bn_512(&_m, m); + memset(_t, 0, 64); + + /* Inits */ + BN_init(&two_768); + BN_init(&two_640); + BN_init(&two_128); + BN_init(&two_512); + BN_init(&tmp); + BN_init(&tmp2); + + /* Create our context */ + if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { goto err; } + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + + /* + * For production, if you care, these only need to be set once, + * and may be made constants. + */ + BN_lshift(&two_768, BN_value_one(), 768); + BN_lshift(&two_640, BN_value_one(), 640); + BN_lshift(&two_128, BN_value_one(), 128); + BN_lshift(&two_512, BN_value_one(), 512); + + if (0 == (m[7] & 0x8000000000000000)) { + exit(1); + } + if (0 == (m[0] & 0x1)) { /* Odd modulus required for Mont */ + exit(1); + } + + /* Precompute m1 */ + BN_mod(&tmp, &two_768, &_m, ctx); + if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m1[0])) { + goto err; } + + /* Precompute m2 */ + BN_mod(&tmp, &two_640, &_m, ctx); + if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 8, &data->m2[0])) { + goto err; + } + + /* + * Precompute k1, a 128b number = ((-1)* m-1 ) mod 2128; k1 should + * be non-negative. + */ + BN_mod_inverse(&tmp, &_m, &two_128, ctx); + if (!BN_is_zero(&tmp)) { BN_sub(&tmp, &two_128, &tmp); } + if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp, 2, &data->k1[0])) { + goto err; } + + /* Precompute t */ + for (i=0; i<8; i++) { + BN_zero(&tmp); + if (i & 1) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); } + if (i & 2) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_512, &tmp); } + if (i & 4) { BN_add(&tmp, &two_640, &tmp); } + + BN_nnmod(&tmp2, &tmp, &_m, ctx); + if (!bn_extract_to_array_512(&tmp2, 8, _t)) { + goto err; } + for (j=0; j<8; j++) data->t[j][i] = _t[j]; } + + /* Precompute m */ + for (i=0; i<8; i++) { + data->m[i] = m[i]; } + + ret = 1; + +err: + /* Cleanup */ + if (ctx != NULL) { + BN_CTX_end(ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); } + BN_free(&two_768); + BN_free(&two_640); + BN_free(&two_128); + BN_free(&two_512); + BN_free(&tmp); + BN_free(&tmp2); + BN_free(&_m); + + return ret; +} + + +static int e_rsax_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) + { + BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy; + BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1; + BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1; + int ret=0; + + BN_CTX_start(ctx); + r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + + { + BIGNUM local_p, local_q; + BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL; + int error = 0; + + /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery + * intialization uses the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag + * (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set) + */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + BN_init(&local_p); + p = &local_p; + BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + + BN_init(&local_q); + q = &local_q; + BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + { + p = rsa->p; + q = rsa->q; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) + { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx)) + error = 1; + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx)) + error = 1; + } + + /* clean up */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + BN_free(&local_p); + BN_free(&local_q); + } + if ( error ) + goto err; + } + + if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* compute I mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + dmq1 = &local_dmq1; + BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + dmq1 = rsa->dmq1; + + if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_q, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 0, rsa->q) )) goto err; + + /* compute I mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + c = &local_c; + BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + } + + /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + dmp1 = &local_dmp1; + BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + dmp1 = rsa->dmp1; + + if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_p, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 1, rsa->p) )) goto err; + + if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err; + /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does + * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; + + if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; + + /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + pr1 = &local_r1; + BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + pr1 = r1; + if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; + + /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of + * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still + * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following + * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. + * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because + * they ensure p > q [steve] + */ + if (BN_is_negative(r0)) + if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; + if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; + if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err; + + if (rsa->e && rsa->n) + { + if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) )) + goto err; + + /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation + * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of + * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check + * for absolute equality, just congruency. */ + if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err; + if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err; + if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) + if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err; + if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) + { + /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak + * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) + * mod_exp and return that instead. */ + + BIGNUM local_d; + BIGNUM *d = NULL; + + if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) + { + d = &local_d; + BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + else + d = rsa->d; + if (!e_rsax_bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx, + rsa->_method_mod_n, e_rsax_get_ctx(rsa, 2, rsa->n) )) goto err; + } + } + ret=1; + +err: + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + + return ret; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ +#endif /* !COMPILE_RSAX */