--- /dev/null
+/* ssl/d1_both.c */
+/*
+ * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
+ * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
+ if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
+ long ii; \
+ for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
+ } else { \
+ long ii; \
+ bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
+ for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
+ bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
+ } }
+
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
+ long ii; \
+ OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
+ is_complete = 1; \
+ if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
+ if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
+ if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
+
+#if 0
+#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
+ long ii; \
+ printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
+ printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
+ printf("\n"); }
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
+static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
+
+/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
+static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28};
+
+static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu);
+static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *p);
+static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len);
+static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
+ long max, int *ok);
+
+static hm_fragment *
+dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
+ {
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
+ if ( buf == NULL)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
+ frag->fragment = buf;
+
+ /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
+ if (reassembly)
+ {
+ bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ if (bitmask == NULL)
+ {
+ if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
+ }
+
+ frag->reassembly = bitmask;
+
+ return frag;
+ }
+
+static void
+dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
+ {
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
+ }
+ if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ }
+
+/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
+int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ int curr_mtu;
+ unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
+
+ /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu =
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+
+ /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
+ * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
+ if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu())
+ {
+ s->d1->mtu = 0;
+ s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
+ s->d1->mtu, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+#if 0
+ mtu = s->d1->mtu;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
+
+ mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+
+ if ( curr_mtu > 0)
+ mtu = curr_mtu;
+ else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
+ {
+ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */
+
+ if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
+ (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ if (s->write_hash)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ else
+ mac_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
+ (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
+ blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
+ else
+ blocksize = 0;
+
+ frag_off = 0;
+ while( s->init_num)
+ {
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
+ DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
+
+ if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
+ ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if ( ret <= 0)
+ return ret;
+ curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
+ mac_size - blocksize;
+ }
+
+ if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
+
+
+ /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
+ if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+ {
+ if ( s->init_off != 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
+ len = curr_mtu;
+ else
+ len = s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
+ len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
+
+ OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
+ len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ {
+ /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
+ * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
+ * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
+ * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
+ * retransmit
+ */
+ if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
+ s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
+ BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
+ else
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+
+ /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
+ * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
+ OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
+
+ if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
+ {
+ /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
+ * we'll ignore the result anyway */
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
+ const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+ int xlen;
+
+ if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+ {
+ /* reconstruct message header is if it
+ * is being sent in single fragment */
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
+ }
+
+ if (ret == s->init_num)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
+ (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ return(1);
+ }
+ s->init_off+=ret;
+ s->init_num-=ret;
+ frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+ }
+ }
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+
+/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
+ * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
+ * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
+ * fragments.
+ */
+long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ int i, al;
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned long msg_len;
+
+ /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
+ * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
+ {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
+ if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ *ok=1;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
+ return s->init_num;
+ }
+
+ msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+again:
+ i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
+ if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
+ i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
+ goto again;
+ else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
+ return i;
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+
+ /* reconstruct message header */
+ *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
+ l2n3(0,p);
+ l2n3(msg_len,p);
+ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ p, msg_len,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (!s->d1->listen)
+ s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
+
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return s->init_num;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+
+static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
+ {
+ size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
+
+ msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ /* sanity checking */
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
+ {
+ /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
+ * against max above */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
+ s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
+ }
+ else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
+ {
+ /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
+ * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
+ return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* no error */
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+ * if so:
+ * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+ * (2) update s->init_num
+ */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int al;
+
+ *ok = 0;
+ item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
+ if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
+ {
+ unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
+ pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
+
+ al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
+
+ if (al==0) /* no alert */
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
+ frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+ }
+
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+
+ if (al==0)
+ {
+ *ok = 1;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+ if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+ return s->max_cert_list;
+ return max_len;
+ }
+
+static int
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+ {
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ int i = -1, is_complete;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+ msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (frag_len == 0)
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+ if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ {
+ item = NULL;
+ frag = NULL;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
+ * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+ * does not need to be freed.
+ */
+ if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+ while (frag_len)
+ {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0) goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+ }
+
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i=-1;
+ if (i<=0)
+ goto err;
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
+ (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
+
+ RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
+ is_complete);
+
+ if (is_complete)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
+ frag->reassembly = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if (item == NULL)
+ {
+ i = -1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+ * would never have reached this branch. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+
+static int
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+{
+ int i=-1;
+ hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
+ pitem *item = NULL;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
+
+ if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
+
+ /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
+ * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
+ */
+ if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ item = NULL;
+
+ /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
+ * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
+ * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
+ * retransmit.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
+ msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
+ (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
+ {
+ unsigned char devnull [256];
+
+ while (frag_len)
+ {
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ devnull,
+ frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
+ if (i<=0) goto err;
+ frag_len -= i;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+ goto err;
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
+ if (frag_len)
+ {
+ /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
+ i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
+ if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+ i = -1;
+ if (i<=0)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+ * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+ * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+ * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+ * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+ * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+ * been discarded. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
+ }
+
+ return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
+
+err:
+ if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+
+
+static long
+dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
+ {
+ unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
+ unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
+ int i,al;
+ struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
+
+ redo:
+ /* see if we have the required fragment already */
+ if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
+ {
+ if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+ }
+
+ /* read handshake message header */
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
+ if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
+ if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* parse the message fragment header */
+ dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
+
+ /*
+ * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
+ * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
+ * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
+ * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
+ return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
+ frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
+
+ if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
+ return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
+
+ if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
+ wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
+ {
+ /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
+ * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
+ * if their format is correct. Does not count for
+ * 'Finished' MAC. */
+ if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ goto redo;
+ }
+ else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
+ goto f_err;
+
+ /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
+ s->state=stn;
+
+ if ( frag_len > 0)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
+ &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
+ /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ *ok = 0;
+ return i;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ i = 0;
+
+ /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
+ * handshake to fail */
+ if (i != (int)frag_len)
+ {
+ al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ *ok = 1;
+
+ /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
+ * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
+ * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
+ * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
+ s->init_num = frag_len;
+ return frag_len;
+
+f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ *ok=0;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p,*d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ p+=i;
+ l=i;
+
+ /* Copy the finished so we can use it for
+ * renegotiation checks
+ */
+ if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16
+ /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless
+ * I do this.
+ */
+ l&=0xffff;
+#endif
+
+ d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l);
+ s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0);
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+
+/* for these 2 messages, we need to
+ * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
+ * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
+ * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
+ * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
+ * ssl->session->read_compression assign
+ * ssl->session->read_hash assign
+ */
+int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (s->state == a)
+ {
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS;
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
+ s->init_num+=2;
+ }
+
+ s->init_off=0;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
+
+ /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
+ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
+
+ s->state=b;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
+ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
+ }
+
+static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int n;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ n=i2d_X509(x,NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3)))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]);
+ l2n3(n,p);
+ i2d_X509(x,&p);
+ *l+=n+3;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+
+ /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */
+ buf=s->init_buf;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+ if (x != NULL)
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+ X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
+
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ {
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ }
+ /* Thawte special :-) */
+ for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++)
+ {
+ x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i);
+ if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+ l2n3(l,p);
+ l+=3;
+ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]);
+ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l);
+
+ l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ return(l);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
+ {
+ if ( code > 0)
+ {
+ fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
+ {
+ /* not a timeout, none of our business,
+ let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
+ return code;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+#else
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
+#endif
+ {
+ BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
+ return code;
+ }
+
+#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
+ item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
+ if ( item )
+ {
+ /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+
+#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
+ if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
+ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
+ DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
+#endif
+
+ return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+ {
+ /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
+ * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
+ * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
+ * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
+ * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
+ * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
+ * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+ */
+ return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
+ piterator iter;
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
+
+ for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
+ 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+
+ /* this function is called immediately after a message has
+ * been serialized */
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
+ if (!frag)
+ return 0;
+
+ memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
+
+ if ( is_ccs)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
+ DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
+ }
+
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
+ frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+
+ /* save current state*/
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
+
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
+ fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
+ fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
+#endif
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
+ int *found)
+ {
+ int ret;
+ /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
+ pitem *item;
+ hm_fragment *frag ;
+ unsigned long header_length;
+ unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+ unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
+
+ /*
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+ OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+ */
+
+ /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
+
+ item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
+ *found = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *found = 1;
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+
+ if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
+ header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ else
+ header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+
+ memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
+ s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
+ frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
+ frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+
+ /* save current state */
+ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+ saved_state.session = s->session;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+
+ /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+ s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
+ SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ /* restore current state */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+ s->session = saved_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
+ s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
+
+ (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
+void
+dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+
+ for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
+ {
+ dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+unsigned char *
+dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
+ if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
+ {
+ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
+ }
+
+ dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
+ frag_off, frag_len);
+
+ return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+
+/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
+static void
+dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->type = mt;
+ msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
+ msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+ }
+
+static void
+dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
+ unsigned long frag_len)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
+ msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
+ }
+
+static unsigned char *
+dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+ {
+ struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
+
+ *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
+
+ s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
+ l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
+
+ return p;
+ }
+
+unsigned int
+dtls1_min_mtu(void)
+ {
+ return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
+ sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
+ }
+
+static unsigned int
+dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if ( curr_mtu == 0 )
+ return g_probable_mtu[0] ;
+
+ for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++)
+ if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i])
+ return g_probable_mtu[i];
+
+ return curr_mtu;
+ }
+
+void
+dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
+ {
+ memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
+ msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
+
+ n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
+ n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
+ }
+
+void
+dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
+ {
+ memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
+
+ ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
+ }
+
+int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
+ {
+ int ret;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
+ !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
+ {
+ ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
+ if (ret < 0) return -1;
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
+#endif
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+int
+dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
+ unsigned short hbtype;
+ unsigned int payload;
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
+ if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
+ int r;
+
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
+ * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
+ * payload, plus padding
+ */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
+ bp = buffer;
+
+ /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
+ *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
+ s2n(payload, bp);
+ memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
+ bp += payload;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
+
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
+
+ if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buffer, write_length,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buffer);
+
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
+ {
+ unsigned int seq;
+
+ /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
+ * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
+ * sequence number */
+ n2s(pl, seq);
+
+ if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
+ {
+ dtls1_stop_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int
+dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
+ {
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+ int ret;
+ unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
+ unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
+
+ /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
+ if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
+ s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
+ if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
+ * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
+
+ /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+ * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+ * some random stuff.
+ * - Message Type, 1 byte
+ * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+ * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+ * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+ * - Padding
+ */
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ p = buf;
+ /* Message Type */
+ *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
+ /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
+ s2n(payload, p);
+ /* Sequence number */
+ s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
+ /* 16 random bytes */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* Random padding */
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
+
+ ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ {
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
+ buf, 3 + payload + padding,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ dtls1_start_timer(s);
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
projects / cassiopeia.git / blobdiff