+++ /dev/null
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
- "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
- RSA_eay_init,
- RSA_eay_finish,
- 0, /* flags */
- NULL,
- 0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
- };
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
- }
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
-
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
- BN_BLINDING *ret;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
-
- ret = rsa->blinding;
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
- {
- /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
- *local = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
- *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
- * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
- * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
- * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
- */
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- {
- if (!got_write_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
- }
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
- ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
- }
-
- err:
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- if (unblind == NULL)
- /* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
- * in BN_BLINDING. */
- return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
- /* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
- * outside BN_BLINDING. */
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
- }
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
- BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- /* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
- * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
- * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
- * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
- * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
- * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
- */
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
- }
-
-/* signing */
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- BN_init(&local_d);
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d= rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
- if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
- res = f;
- else
- res = ret;
- }
- else
- res = ret;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(res);
- i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
-
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret;
- int j,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- /* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
- * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
- * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
- BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- {
- if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
-
-/* signature verification */
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
- if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
-
- p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
-
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
- BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
- int ret=0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- {
- BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
- BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-
- /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
- */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- BN_init(&local_p);
- p = &local_p;
- BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
- BN_init(&local_q);
- q = &local_q;
- BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- {
- p = rsa->p;
- q = rsa->q;
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
- {
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
- if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
- /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
- * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- pr1 = &local_r1;
- BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- pr1 = r1;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
- * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
- * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
- * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
- */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
-
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
- * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
- * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
- * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
- {
- /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
- * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
- * mod_exp and return that instead. */
-
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
- }
- ret=1;
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return(ret);
- }
-
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return(1);
- }
-
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return(1);
- }
-
-#endif
projects / cassiopeia.git / blobdiff